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Western governmental responses to the vari-
ous political crises which erupted in the Balkans af-
ter 1989 have been remarkably uniform. There is a
widespread feeling among govemmentalleaders and
their policy advisers that western Europe ought to
insulate itself from the various inter-state and inter-
nal conflicts which have periodically flared up in
the region. No core western interests appear to be at
stake, whether these are expressed in moral, secu-
rity, or economic terms. Minimal intervention via the
offices of the United Nations came about in Bosnia
mainly because public opinion and the independent
media were horrified by images of warfare mainly
directed at defenceless civilians.
A Defective West Euro-
pean Mind-set
Despite the Cold War,
the chief external actors
played down the connection
between communism, par-
ticularly the national Stali-
nist variety, and the revival
of inter-ethnic disputes.
Chauvinist communists in a
bid to resist the forces of de-
mocratization unfroze dor-
mant ethnic conflicts and
gave new life to the forces
of ethnocentrism. Western
governments preferred to
adopt a longer time frame in
seeking explanations for
Balkan political instability.
The problems of the area
were historically recurrent
and insoluble and could be
summed up by the phrase the
prevalence of ancient ethnic
hatreds. The ancient ethnic
hatreds thesis is analysed
and criticised in two works. 1
* This article had been prepared
before the action Allied Forces
All political actors seemed to be guilty of push-
ing their differences to the point of violent division
and fratricidal conflict. It was simply the pre-or-
dained Balkan way. The idea that certain peoples are
historically programmed to be violent and external
intervention is pointless in such situations of con-
flict, meant a retreat from the obligation to defend
international law and certain basic standards of in-
ternational behaviour. Interestingly, at key moments
the leading west European players shared with mili-
tant nationalists the historically deterministic view
that the ethnic problems of the region could only be
settled by military force and the involuntary transfer
of populations in order to create homogeneous states
or regions. The differences
between them was that west
European leaders regretted
the triumph of social Dar-
winism in the Balkans
whereas ethn ic hardliners
viewed it as a natural course
of events.
The policy of ethnic
cleansing in order to create
manageable political units
from a mosaic of ethnic
groups had been sanctioned
at various international con-
ferences convened by west
European powers from the
Congress of Berlin in 1878
to Lausanne in 1922 and
meant to impose order in the
Balkans. But after 1945 the
widespread acceptance of
international laws protecting
the rights of minorities
meant that it was less easy
to uproot settled populations
in the name of realpolitik.
However, the Balkans
appeared to be an exception
to the widely-held view (re-
iterated at the treaty of Paris
in 1990) that Europe must
Western governmental responses to
the various political crises which
erupted in the Balkans after 1989
have been remarkably uniform. The
Balkans was a region that seemed
scarcely fit for democracy.
The balance of evidence suggests
that influential Western statesmen
believed that in the Balkans only
strong and ruthless leaders were
capable of controlling turbulent
citizens and containing conflict in
ethnic trouble-spots.
In 1995, a US-led intervention in
Bosnia led to the cessation of fighting
there. The peace-building strategy, as
enunciated by Richard Holbrooke had
a number of features of relevance
beyond Bosnia.
Major players, such as the USA,
Germany and Britain, insisted that no
force would be sent to Albania.
Until Europe buries its damaging
Balkan complex, it will continue to
make avoidable policy blunders
stemming from arrogance and stupid-
ity that will jeopardise security and
well-being throughout Europe.
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never again become the scene of fratricidal conflict
of the kind witnessed between 1939 and 1945. Old
foreign policies relating to the Balkans were resur-
rected even if they stretched back before 1914 and
had proved ineffective then as models for conflict
resolution. Among policy-makers dealing with the
Balkans, there was a barely-disguised feeling that
fresh thought was useless given the deeply-rooted
and atavistic nature of conflicts there.
The Balkans was a region that seemed scarcely
fitted for democracy. Television images suggested
that political fanaticism and general lawlessness were
the norm. In such conditions, it appears futile to de-
fend civilized values and shield civilians from the
results of a breakdown of civilized behaviour.
The worst aspects of political life are seen as
normal for the whole region. Thus leaders like
Siobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, far from
being seen as aberrant figures, were viewed for a
long time as fully representative of the political cul-
ture of the region. Instead, it was leaders like Kiro
Gligorov in Macedonia who has struggled to pre-
serve a balance of tolerance in his ethnically divided
country, or else the representatives of Bosnian multi-
culturalism, who were seen as abnormal on account
of their moderation.
Significantly, those engaged in shuttle diplo-
macy for the international community, consulted far
more often with ethnic hardliners than with moder-
ates, thus giving legitimacy to the former and with-
holding it from the latter. In 1996 it was still a cause
of bitterness among the Serbian opposition, that Lord
Owen, the chief European negotiator in former Yugo-
slavia from 1992 to 1995, only consulted with Presi-
dent Milosevic on his visits to the Serbian capital.'
The balance of evidence suggests that influ-
ential western statesmen believed that in the Balkans,
only strong and ruthless leaders were capable of con-
trolling turbulent citizens and containing conflict in
ethnic trouble-spots. Slobodan Milo sevic
metaphorphised from being 'the Butcher of the
Balkans' to being the region's chief peace-maker by
the time of the 1995 Dayton Peace accord over
Bosnia because of his ability to neutralise hard line
forces, ones that he had originally brought into play
to secure his own power by carving out a Greater
Serbia from the ruins of Yugoslavia. His sultanistic
practices, whereby he viewed public assets as his
own private prerequisites, did not exclude Western
recognition and backing from his regime once he was
no longer seen to be acting as a regional trouble-
maker. Similar unqualified backing was extended to
President Berisha in Albania despite the unsavoury
features of his rule. While Milosevic had forced the
Bosnian Serb leadership to sign up at Dayton, Berisha
restrained Albanian nationalism in Macedonia and
Kosovo.
The natural corollary of this approach was that
a strong regional power was required to provide geo-
political order. Until 1995, the west European ap-
proach was to 'contain the fighting and to impose a
settlement that would in effect acknowledge the Serbs
as the victors. '3
EU states backed local despots because there
was great scepticism about the ability of their popu-
lations to aspire to any better form of government.
But this policy of excusing tyranny in the region had
been undermined by the second half of the 1990s.
By now it was clear that conflicts unleashed by des-
potic leaders could not be confined to the Balkans
alone and threatened the security of the rest of Eu-
rope, also the internal instability produced by their
arbitrary and rapacious rule had politically danger-
ous repercussions elsewhere. Cold War allies, par-
ticularly Britain and the USA, engaged in bitter quar-
rels as such a policy produced repeated failures. The
prestige of the West was tarnished, NATO seemed
an increasingly impotent security umbrella, and there
was mounting unease that weakness and irresolution
in the face of armed groups in the Balkans using ter-
ror as an instrument of war, would lead to the defi-
ance of international norms elsewhere."
In 1995 a US-led intervention in Bosnia led to
the cessation of fighting there. The peace-building
strategy, as enunciated by Richard Holbrooke, the
chief architect of the Dayton accord, had a number
of features of relevance beyond Bosnia.
1. The need to isolate nationalist hardliners in
Bosnia itself and promote moderate forces capable
of arranging compromises across the various ethnic
divides.
2. A drive to contain ethnic tensions in other
Balkan states which, in more limited form, contained
some of the characteristics that produced conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.
3. An increase in visible US interest in the
Balkans which was no longer viewed as being an
area of peripheral concern to US security. In J 996-
97 the US has put some effort in trying to get Balkan
states to overcome their distrust of one another by
forming a South-East European Co-operation Initia-
tive.
The Crisis of Balkan Post-Communism
Popular challenges to governments with roots
in the Communist era occurred across the Balkans
during the winter of 1996-7. Ordinary citizens, fac-
ing impoverishment as the region's economy de-
clined, abandoned their apathy about political change
in order to keep his regime afloat lay behind his de-
cision to privatise lucrative sectors of the economy
rather than any belated conversion to free market
economics.
In February 1996, the junior Foreign Office
minister, Sir Nicholas Bonsor led a British trade
mission to Serbia to see what was on offer. Later in
the year, Douglas Hurd, the chief architect of the
West's minimalist approach to the 1991-95 wars in
ex-Yugoslavia, arrived in Belgrade looking for con-
tracts. He secured for his employer, the National
Westminster Bank, a contract worth $15 million to
organize the privatization of Serbia's telecommuni-
cations. Accompanying him was Dame Pauline
Neville-Jones who was the Foreign Office's repre-
sentative at the Dayton talks. Both of them eventu-
ally withdrew in face of hostile press coverage, in-
cluding a stinging editorial in The Times.'
Another newspaper, The Independent com-
plained that 'Western countries are all too ready to
offer foreign capital to prop up his (Milosevic 's)
gangster-ridden economy and make some money for
themselves in the bargain'. 6 However, by early 1997,
some Western governments were beginning to re-
assess their previous Balkan policies. The scale of
the grassroots revolt against Milosevic after he an-
nulled local elections of November 1996 which hc
had lost, produced a re-think about the merits of re-
taining him in office. The opposition was no longer
dismissed as a force of permanent losers. The
Zajedno coalition began to be viewed as an alterna-
tive power centre to Milosevic and its leaders were
invited to Paris and London for top-level meetings.
Meanwhile, Washington made it clear that a violent
repression of protesters would invoke a restoration
of sanctions. Against this background, cynical views
about the alienation of the Serbs as a race from de-
mocracy were heard less often. The commitment of
the hundreds of thousands of young, middle-class,
and working-class protesters in Belgrade and other
centres to rejoining Europe was unmistakable.
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and swelled protests about corruption, economic
mismanagement, and fraudulent elections.
Except in Albania, where the prospect of penury
unleashed mass anarchy, street protests were usually
controlled and peaceful. These were not spasmodic
bursts of rage of the kind which occur in repressive
states after the lid on the political pressure cooker has
been lifted. In Bulgaria and Serbia, the state did two
things unusual for the Balkans: it made concessions
to its political opponents without using violence and
acknowledged that its authority had limits.
In Romania, the largest state in the region, a
genuine contest for power which many thought im-
possible in such a flawed democracy, saw the tri-
umph of the reformist Democratic Convention in
November's elections.
Inter-ethnic conflict has been noticeably ab-
sent from the 1996-7 unrest. Cornered elites were
this time unable to disable their opponents by stir-
ring up ethnic hatreds. Indeed, the manipulation of
nationalism by ex-Communists has been failing as a
strategy of control for several years'.
The gravity of the crisis of the Balkan regional
economy has made appeals to historic ethnic griev-
ances redundant. The dismal record of regimes which
had promised social protection to workers and peas-
ants while allowing state assets to be plundered by
party hacks and their clients, became impossible to
conceal from ordinary citizens, at least in the cities,
despite tight control of the state media.
The depth of the economic decline in the
Balkans and the way it has spread through society,
exceeds in magnitude the catastrophe that overtook
the capitalist economies during the Great Depres-
sion: there are very few examples of infant democ-
racies withstanding unaided the economic and so-
cial hardships which are the norm for millions of
people there.
The level of external support for reformist
governments and opposition movements in Roma-
nia, Bulgaria and Serbia will help to decide their fate.
Targetted assistance in the Balkans to help govern-
ments rebuild collapsing national infrastructures and
reduce the pain of economic shock-therapy will prob-
ably be more beneficial for West European security
than an emphasis on NATO enlargement or the ex-
tension of the EU into the Balkans which will re-
main a mirage for a long time to come.
Western governments were slow to appreci-
ate the growing weakness of post-communist regimes
in the Balkans. Until the scale of the urban revolt
against President Milosevic became clear, Britain and
France were emphasising the need to build profit-
able economic links with the incumbent regime in
Serbia. Milosevic 's need to find large sums of cash
Western Europe and the 1997 Albanian Crisis
Disciplined and moving rallies against neo-
communist rule in Serbia and Bulgaria and a peace-
ful transfer of power in Romania provided the
Balkans with a more positive image in the west than
it had obtained for a long time and suggested that
the region was capable of following the reformist
path of countries like Poland and Hungary. But the
social breakdown and collapse of state authority
which occurred in Albania in March 1997 revived
negative images of the Balkans in western Europe
and the half-measures proposed to contain the crisis
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were similar to the ones recommended in the early
stages of the Yugoslav crisis.
The collapse of fraudulent pyramid schemes in
which a large proportion of citizens had invested their
savings was to trigger a popular revolt against the in-
creasingly arbitrary rule of president Sali Berisha. The
disintegration of the army, mass breakouts from prison,
and the circulation oflooted weapons among the popu-
lation, created disturbing television images that re-
vived familiar stereotypes about the Balkans. Against
the background of the country's fabled isolation and
turbulence, it was easy to depict the Albanians per se
as a race of wild fanatics. These negative stereotypes
were reflected in the actions of western leaders and
not a few commentators. But anarchy was not a result
of any Albanian predisposition to violence. The gov-
ernment had blocked the route to peaceful change in
previous years and left Albanians only with limited
options, to emigrate or take to the streets to air their
grievances." Until its final months, the Berisha gov-
ernment had been shored up by key western govern-
ments, particularly Britain and Italy. No real pressure
had been put on Berisha when he suppressed the in-
dependent judiciary and attempted to do the same with
the media. The fraudulent election of 1996 were al-
lowed to stand as a result of the intervention of the
Italian and German ambassadors who overrode the
objections of a majority of international observers
whose report on the poll revealed serious irregulari-
ties'." Berisha was viewed particularly by Britain as a
pillar of anti-communism despite his previous role as
an important functionary in the previous regime. Ac-
cording to Sir Reginald Hibbert, a former British am-
bassador to France (whose knowledge of Albania
stretched back to the Second World War when, as a
British Army officer, he was stationed there behind
enemy lines), interference from top British politicians
on behalf of Berisha ultimately helped to deepen Al-
banian divisions." The West largely turned a blind eye
to the pyramid schemes which could not have sur-
vived for so long without the active backing of the
government. It lauded Berisha as a pioneer of free
market economics in the Balkans (Albania receiving
the highest per capita level of EU aid of any East Eu-
ropean country), even though privatisation was car-
ried out in an arbitrary and uneven way.'? The West
above all failed to check Berisha's slide towards des-
potism because he was viewed as the best person to
restrain Albanian nationalism in the southern Balkans.
Thus democracy was sacrificed for regional
stability and west European actions in the period
between the rigged May 1996 elections and the anti-
Berisha revolt of March 1997, revealed a big respon-
sibility on the part of several governments for the
unfolding violence and disorder.
But it was Britain and Germany, two coun-
tries which had shielded Berisha from condemna-
tion despite his tyrannical ways, who insisted that
the conflict should be allowed to bum itself out and
that foreign intervention would do no good. This was
the message Franz Vranitzky, the former Austrian
chancellor and OSCE representative in Albania was
given when he reported that order could only be re-
stored in Albania with help from abroad. Vranitzky
said on 8 March that' a coalition of those wiIling to
take action' should be organized by governments
belonging to the EU or the 54-nation OSCE. II
But appeals to mobilise the law-abiding ma-
jority of Albanians against a criminal minority prof-
iting from the turmoil fell on deaf ears because of
the prevalence of negative stereotypes about this
Balkan state. Calls for a police action designed to
restore order, disarm citizens as far as possible, and
pave the way for the return of an elected govern-
ment based on the rule of law, were only supported
by states which felt directly at risk from the Alba-
nian disorder. Italy felt most at risk. It feared the ef-
fects of a lucrative trade in drugs, military hardware
and illegal immigrants which had already made Al-
bania one big transit depot for all kinds of contra-
band. France, aware of the dangers of uncontrolled
emigration across the Mediterranean because of the
Algerian conflict, feared that Albania could become
a bleeding ulcer exporting crime and misery across
the continent. Denmark, far removed from the
Balkans, held the chairmanship of the OSCE, had
peace-keeping troops in the former Yugoslavia, and
was aware that their lives could be at risk by an in-
adequate response to such an emergency.
Although major players like the USA, Ger-
many and Britain insisted that no force would be sent
to Albania under the auspices of the UN or NATO,
minimal agreement on sending a small outside force
with a limited mandate was secured by Italy which
had most to lose from inaction over Albania. A 5,000
strong force whose purpose would be limited to pro-
tecting, to supervising the distribution of hum anitar-
ian aid, was agreed by the end of March with the
first contingents starting to arrive in April. Italy was
providing half the force, several other countries
agreeing to send small contingents. But NATO re-
fused to be formally involved and the EU is power-
less to act because of the failure of western states to
build on one of the key objectives of the 1992
Maastricht Treaty that the EU should develop a com-
mon foreign and security policy. 12
Italy was effectively abandoned by most of its
other EU and NATO partners and left to spearhead
an international mission to Albania which many felt
to be doomed from the start because of its limited
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Conclusionmandate and resources." 'The painful truth is that
Europe is not ready to carry out such missions be-
cause governments have neither the capacity to carry
them out nor the will to do so', said a senior NATO
diplomat interviewed by the Washington Post in
March 1997.14
If a fragmented Albania becomes a zone of
disorder in which an Italian-led force supervising
relief becomes a pawn of warring parties, it will be a
replay of events which unfolded in Bosnia between
1992 and 1994. The Italian-led force in Albania like
UNPROFOR in Bosnia before it lacks the power to
disarm civilians, the amount of weaponry in civilian
hands going to the crux of the Albanian crisis. The
political shock-waves of a poorly-conceived inter-
vention are already being felt in Italy where a weak
left-wing government is struggling to remain in
power against a strong centre-right nationalist op-
position.
If Albania becomes a rogue society whose law-
lessness threatens western Europe, no western state
whose security is harmed is likely to stand by and
endure the fall-out. But if future intervention to im-
pose peace is punitive in its conception and carried
out when well-armed factions have solidified their
power, an outside force is likely to come to grief."
The OSCE's representative Franz Vranitzky
who was probably the west European public figure
most aware of the gravity of the situation when the
Albanian crisis first exploded, argued then that there
was no alternative to outside intervention and that
'the decision had to be taken very quickly' .16 But
historically West European leaders have been inca-
pable of concentrating their minds on crises in the
Balkans and thinking through the steps that need to
be taken to dampen down conflict. The only deci-
sion which was easily arrived at was the one to hold
elections in Albania under OSCE supervision on 29
June 1997. Not a few political practitioners and
analysis on both sides of the Atlantic see elections
as an instant panacea which can draw the poison out
of conflict-ridden situations and allow moderate
forces to ineluctably come to the fore. This was the
hope when elections were hastily-arranged in war-
tom Bosnia in September 1996 only to result in the
advocates of ethnic politics strengthening their hold.
The American thinker Henry Adams, when referring
to his own country, described elections as 'the sys-
tematic organization of hatreds' and with civil soci-
ety shattered and armed groups able to intimidate
civilians with impunity, his words may bear fruit in
Albania in a way that will once again reveal the bank-
ruptcy of the Western response to a crisis in a Balkan
state which western interests contributed to in the
first place by their short-term and partisan behaviour.
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Western governments have a chronically de-
fective approach to the crises which flared up in the
Balkans during the 1990s as a result of the failings
of communist rule and longer-term problems con-
nected with state-building and reconciling conflict-
ing ethnic aspirations. The area is seen as essentially
non-European and its populations incapable of as-
piring to post-1945 European standards of political
behaviour. Obsolete policies which in some cases
dated back to before World War I, were applied de-
spite radically altered conditions in the Balkans.
Competing agendas based on outworn formulae led
to paralysis and division between various western
countries. Short-term approaches to specific emer-
gencies were preferred to a total policy approach
based on effective conflict resolution, insistence on
good human rights regimes, and backing for a strat-
egy of social and economic reconstruction.
The Bosnia crisis produced no learning curve
in the major West European foreign ministries. The
response to the Albanian crisis of 1996-97 showed
that key Western players were unwilling to learn from
past mistakes in Bosnia. Key actors such as Britain's
Lord Owen, former US Secretary of State James Baker,
and numerous officials down to the level of ambassa-
dor, could commit serious mistakes, sometimes result-
ing in tragic human consequences, and not risk seri-
ous official censure or a termination of their public
roles because neither the Balkans nor its peoples arc
taken very seriously by western policy-makers. The
survival of ancient stereotypes about the Balkans in a
post-modem era means that the region is placed near
the bottom of a geo-political hierarchy, at least in the
eyes of influential west European statesmen. Its infe-
rior ranking means that minimal standards of interna-
tional law and morality do not need to be defended
when they are comprehensively violated, as they were
in Bosnia. Official western Europe's main impulse is
to prevent the problems ofthe Balkans contaminating
its own space, but only a minority of politicians realise
that a policy of containing disorder rather than tack-
ing its root causes, is only likely to worsen matters for
all concerned, western as well as south-eastern and
central Europe.
Despite the obsession with historical stereo-
types, there is an unwillingness to recognise that pre-
vious west European (and Russian) interventions
contributed to many of the problems which the west
is unwilling to face up to today. A diplomatic carve-
up of the region among the Great Powers between
the end of the Crimean war in 1854 and the treaty of
Versailles in 1919, created unviable territories, re-
bellious minorities, and states which felt they had
ernments were actively prepared to support authori-
tarian governments in the Balkans in the interests of
stability:
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been cheated of real estate that was rightfully their's.
It is hardly surprising that the track record of west
European states (and the Russian one in its Tsarist
and Leninist manifestations) towards the region over
the last one hundred years, has fuelled defensive
nationalism among insecure local elites.
Since 1995 there have been signs that liberal-
ism, a desire for regional co-operation, and a rejec-
tion of chauvinism are beginning to emerge as tan-
gible features of Balkan politics. Romania and Bul-
garia have led the way in peacefully displacing neo-
communist regimes. Macedonia has kept a precari-
ous peace on account of the skills of its President; and
even in prostrate Albania, there are opportunities
amidst the chaos to promote a new political elite which
will make national reconstruction the priority rather
than expropriate public property for private gains as
happened in the Berisha years.
West European policy makers will only lose
their defective mind-set towards the Balkans if they
are pressed by local leaders with an electoral man-
date as convincing as theirs, to qualitatively improve
their approach to the area. Emil Constantinescu, a
geologist who was elected President of Romania in
1996 after championing civil society initiatives in a
country which faced one of the severest forms of
totalitarian rule witnessed anywhere in the Soviet
bloc, has led the way.
In a recent interview Constantinescu spoke
frankly about his dismay on seeing that Western gov-
'The neo-communist regimes in Eastern Eu-
rope are often very convenient for the Western World.
It provided them protection against organized crime
and unwanted immigration and even gave them a
basis for feeling superior ... But by supporting them
the west betrayed those fighting for democratic
change ... Today our illusions have ended. We under-
stand clearly that we cannot talk for real with the
West, except in terms of profit and mutual interest.'
Western Europe needs to radically re-think its
strategy towards the Balkans. It should think of inte-
grating the region into a common European economic
and security system rather than sweeping its prob-
lems under the rug. Balkan leaders in opposition and
government with a proven commitment to pluralism
should ask if countries like Britain, Germany and
France really want peace in the Balkans and, if they,
do how much are they willing to invest in it. There is
a need to take the Balkans seriously, to view its prob-
lems from a Balkan perspective, and not form that
of outmoded balance-of-power concepts. IS Until
Western Europe buries its damaging Balkan com-
plex, it will continue to make avoidable policy blun-
ders stemming from arrogance and stupidity that will
jeopardise security and well-being throughout Eu-
ro~. •
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